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O

ne of the more significant, but inadequately recognized, developments
in the field of the law of war which has occurred during the past
half-century is that with respect to the institution of the Protecting Power.
Surprisingly little has been written, especially in English, either on the general
subject of the Protecting Power or on the specific subject of the Protecting
Power and its relationship to the prisoner-of-war problem. 1 This article will
endeavor, to a necessarily limited extent, to fill that void, with the emphasis
being placed on the gradual, but steady, expansion of the authority,
responsibility, and functions of the Protecting Power in ~afeguarding the welfare
of prisoners of war.
The term Protecting Power is comparatively simple of definition. It is a state
which has accepted the responsibility of protecting the interests of another state
in the territory of a third, with which, for some reason, such as war, the second
2
state does not maintain diplomatic relations. Because the protection is most
frequently rendered to nationals of the protected state found in the third state,
the former is often referred to as the Power of Origin and the latter as the Power
of Residence. For obvious reasons, in the case of prisoners of war the state by
which they are held is known as the Detaining Power rather than as the Power of
Residence. And while the term Power of Origin may be a misnomer in the case of
certain prisoners ofwar, as, for example, those who were captured while serving
in the armed forces of a state other than their own, it will be used herein for
lack of a more appropriate term.

I. Historical
The earliest indication of what we now term the Protecting Power probabl~
appeared in the Capitulations of the Ottoman Empire of the sixteenth century.
Curiously enough, in those early days protection of non-nationals came about,
not as a result of agreements reached with the Power ofResidence by the Power
of Origin, but as a result of agreements reached with the Power of Residence
by the prospective Protecting Power itself, the latter having probably been
primarily concerned with the resulting increase in its own prestige and influence
in the territory in which it was acting and in the home territories of the protected
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persons. At that period the Protecting Power was, and in the three succeeding
centuries it remained, completely a creature of custom and usage, with no
conventional basis, definition, or functions. As a result, the extent of the activity
of Protecting Powers varied in different countries and even, with respect to
different Protecting Powers, within the same country. The passage of time
resulted in the passing of the initiative for the designation of a Protecting Power
in a particular case from the Protecting Power to the Power of Origin, where
it more properly belonged. It also resulted in the concept of the Protecting
Power as an international institution becoming more and more firmly intrenched
in international law and practice. In its present form, however, the Protecting
Power dates back less than one century-and its codified form is of even more
recent vintage.
Most writers attribute the modem genesis of the Protecting Power to
developments which occurred during the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871). In
that conflict, probably for the first time, all of the belligerents were represented
by Protecting Powers in the territory of the enemy. England was charged with
the protection of the French in Germany; and the United States, Switzerland,
4
and Russia acted as Protecting Powers in France for the various German States.
It may be said that the expansion of the functions of the Protecting Power during
this conflict was, in large measure, due to two practices which originated during
its course: that of expellin~ enemy consuls; and that of imposing stringent
restrictions on enemy aliens. Unquestionably, each of these practices could and
did contribute to the need for the enlargement of the functions of the Protecting
Power.
The precedents established during the Franco-Prussian War were adhered to
in most subsequent international conflicts, many of which had, however, their
own peculiar aspects. Thus, in the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) each side
requested the United States to act as its Protecting Power and so we find the
same state acting as the Protecting Power for each belligerent within the territory
of the other. Similarly, Germany acted as the Protecting Power for both
belligerents in the !talo-Turkish War (1911-1912) and in the Sino-Soviet War
(1929). Going to the other extreme, in the Greco-Turkish War (1897), Germany
acted as the Protecting Power for Turkey in Greece, while three other nations,
England, France, and Russia, acted joindy for Greece in Turkey; in the
Spanish-American War (1898), England acted as the Protecting Power for the
United States, while France and Austria-Hungary acted joindy for Spain (it was
during this conflict that, for the first time recorded, a belligerent, the United
States, specifically requested neutral inspection of installations within which
prisoners of war were being held);6 and during the Balkan Wars (1912-1913)
France and Russia actedjoindy as the Protecting Power for Montenegro. This
practice of using more than one friendly state as a Protecting Power has since
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almost disappeared, although at one time during World War II Spain was acting
as the Protecting Power forJapan in the continental United States, while Sweden
acted for her in Hawaii, and Switzerland in American Samoa.
The Boer War (1899-1902) may, perhaps, be considered to have been, at
least to some extent, an exception to what was fast becoming a firmly established
institution of international law. Early in that conflict the British requested the
United States to represent their interests with the Boers. Apparendy the consent
of the Boers was not sought and they not only failed to designate a Protecting
Power of their own, but, for all practical purposes, at first refused to recognize
the right of the United States consular representatives to act on behalf of the
British. Subsequendy the Boers did agree to permit the United States consuls in
their territory to perform certain specific and limited functions with respect to
British prisoners of war, upon the understanding that United States consuls in
England would have similar privileges with respect to Boer prisoners of war held
there. 7 Thus, to a limited degree, the institution of the Protecting Power was
recognized even here.
The Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) found the Protecting Powers once
again exercising the full powers which it had become customary to allot to them.
Perhaps as a result of the favorable experiences of the Sino-Japanese War,
immediately upon the outbreak of hostilities Japan requested the United States
to act on its behalf in Russia; while France was designated by Russia as its
Protecting Power in Japan and Korea. And once again, but to an even greater
extent than during the Spanish-American War, we find the representatives of
the Protecting Powers concerning themselves with the welfare of prisoners of
8
war.
Thus it can readily be seen that when World War I burst upon Europe, the
designation of Protecting Powers by belligerents was a firmly established
international custom, although the Protecting Power as an institution had yet
to be the subject of international legislation. During the course of that conflict
four definite items of progress occurred: first, it was during World War I that
public opinion in the belligerent countries achieved an understanding of how a
friendly neutral could represent, at times vigorously, an enemy belligerent and
its nationals;9 second, the use of the Protecting Power as a means ofsafeguarding
the welfare of prisoners of war, although at first somewhat restricted, was later
gready extended and received rather general acceptance;10 third, the practice
was adopted that when a neutral which had been acting as a Protecting Power
itself became embroiled in the conflict, a successor Protecting Power would be
designated to fill the vacuum; 11 and finally, the Protecting Power received legal
recognition in a number of international agreements entered into by various of
the belligerents during the course of the hostilities in which, to a su~rising
1
extent, its functions were spelled out with some degree of definiteness.
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The precedents established during World War I were destined to bear fruit.
A draft prisoner of war convention prepared in 1921 by the International
Committee of the Red Cross (hereinafter referred to as the ICRC) , while
contemplating the use of Protecting Powers for certain limited purposes, would
have assigned to the ICRC the responsibility for establishing mobile
commissions composed of neutrals charged with assuring that the belligerents
were complying with the convention. This proposal was probably due to two
factors: first, the failure of the states which had acted as Protecting Powers during
World War I adequately to report their activities; and second, the belief that the
duties involved in the effective protection of the rights of prisoners of war would
exceed the capacity of the diplomatic personnel of Protecting Powers. 13
However, when the Diplomatic Conference convened in Geneva in 1929 and
drafted the convention which subsequently received the ratification of the vast
majority of states, the ICRC proposal was not adopted and, instead, the basic
principle of the Protecting Power received general acceptance, the former
Protecting Powers taking the position that all that was needed to assure their
activities was that their role "be distinctly set out, and their task clearly
defined.,,14 The Prisoner of War Convention drafted at that Conference15 thus
became the first international agreement negotiated in time ofJ?eace to give
official recognition to the institution of the Protecting Power. 1 However, it
did not create a new international concept. It did not make the use of the
Protecting Power by belligerents obligatory. It did not affect the relationships
which had previously existed between the Power of Origin, the Protecting
Power, and the Detaining Power. It did give the relationship a formal and agreed
status which it had not previously had. It may well be considered that the
provisions of the 1929 Convention relating to Protecting Powers constituted
the most important advance contained in that convention over the provisions
of the regulations relating to prisoners of war contained in the Annex to the
Fourth Hague Convention of 1907. 17 The lessons learned during World War
I had not been forgotten.
The advent of World War II provided, all too soon, an opportunity for the
implementation and testing of this novel international legislation. Most of the
belligerents were represented by Protecting Powers and, in general, these found
the provisions of the 1929 Convention relating to their activities extremely
helpful. True, the designation and functioning of Protecting Powers on behalf
ofprisoners ofwar had previously become an almost universally accepted custom
in international law. But it is necessary to bear in mind that, despite this, in the
U.S.S.R. and Japan, neither of which nations was a party to the 1929
Convention, there was either complete or substantial failure in the functioning
18
of the Protecting Powers. In general, the fact that such a large number of
countries were parties to the World War II hostilities had two distinct but related
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results. In the first place, not only did the absence of strong neutrals present a
problem in the selection of Protecting Powers, but it also meant that there was
no large neutral world public opinion to be affected by violations of the
convention, and the power of neutral public opinion in forcing compliance with
a humanitarian convention cannot be overestimated. And in the second place,
because of the small number of neutrals available to act as Protecting Powers, it
frequently occurred that the same neutral was designated to act as the Protecting
Power for two opposing belligerents.
Once again wartime lessons were not forgotten and on August 12, 1949,just
four years after the final termination of World War II, a new Prisoner of War
19
Convention was signed in which, as we shall see, the functions of the
Protecting Power are identified and defined with even greater particularity than
had been the case in the 1929 Convention. 20 Since that time the hostilities in
Korea have occurred. At the outbreak of those hostilities General Douglas
MacArthur, as the commander of the United Nations Command, immediately
announced that his forces would comply with the humanitarian principles of
the 1949 Convention. In answer to a query made by the ICRC, the Foreign
Minister of the so-called Democratic People's Republic of Korea sent a message
to the Secretary General of the United Nations stating that its forces were
"strictl:t; abiding by principles of Geneva Conventions in respect to Prisoners of
War." 1 Unfortunately, the provisions of the convention relating to the
Protecting Power were evidently not among the principles with which they
were "strictly abiding" so that, despite all efforts expended in this regard, those
..
. 1emente d.22
provlSlons
were never Imp
From the foregoing brief historical survey it is apparent that prior to 1870
only the precursors of the modem Protecting Power existed, and not the latter
itself; that during the period from 1870 to 1914 the concept of the Protecting
Power began to take form, particularly with respect to its relationship to the
problem of the prisoner of war; and that during the period subsequent to 1914
the form has become definite, the institution of the Protecting Power having
become the subject of numerous bilateral and multilateral international
agreements, culminating in the 1949 Geneva Conventions to which most of the
23
nations of the world are parties. It now becomes appropriate to analyze the
form and the character which the Protecting Power received during this
.
24
evo1unonary process.

II. The Modern Concept of the Protecting Power

A. Designation
As will have been noted, Article 86 of the 1929 Convention was, to say the
least, somewhat vaguely worded:
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The High Contracting Parties recognize that the regular application of the present
Convention will find a guaranty in the possibility of collaboration of the protecting
Powers charged with safeguarding the interests of belligerents ... (Italics added.)
There is nothing mandatory here. There is no requirement here that a Protecting
Power actually be designated or that, if designated, it be permitted to function
as such by the Detaining Power. The comparable provision of the 1949
Convention reads quite differendy. Article 8 of this latter convention provides:
The present Convention shall be applied with the cooperation and under the scrutiny of
the Protecting Powers whose duty it is to safeguard the interests of the Parties to
the conflict.... (Italics added.)
It would appear that the designation of Protecting Powers has now become at
least a moral obligation of the belligerent; and that, once designated, a Protecting
Power has a duty not only to the Power of Origin, 25 but also to the other parties
to the conflict, to ~erform the functions which have been assigned to it by the
1949 Convention. 6
What are the qualifications required of a state before it may be designated as
a Protecting Power? It must, first of all, be a state within the meaning of that
term in international law. It must also, of course, be a neutral state--and it is
advisable that it be one which can reasonably be expected to remain neutral,
although this latter qualification has become more and more difficult to assure.
And, finally, it must be a state which maintains diplomatic relations with both
the requesting state (the Power of Origin) and the state in which it is being
requested to operate (the Detaining Power).
How does a state actually become a Protecting Power? The belligerent state
desiring the services of a Protecting Power requests a neutral state which has the
qualifications listed above to act on its behal£ If the latter is willing to assume
the functions of a Protecting Power, it so notifies the requesting state. It must
then obtain from the Detaining Power permission to function as the Protecting
Power for the requesting state vis-a-vis and within the territory of the Detaining
Power. 27 In other words, the actual designation of the Protecting Power is based
upon the request of the Power of Origin and the consent of both the proposed
28
Protecting Power and the Detaining Power.
As we have seen, it has frequendy occurred in the past that more than one
state has been designated as the Protecting Power for a belligerent, and there is
nothing in the 1949 Convention, nor in general international law, to preclude
this practice. However, the advantages of the other extreme-one and the same
Protecting Power for both belligerents-are many. Even a small nation, when
acting as the Protecting Power for both sides, is in a unique position to obtain
a general observance of the law of war by each belligerent on the basis of
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reciprocity. This was made quite apparent during World War II, when
Switzerland acted as the Protecting Power for many of the belligerents on both
sides of the conflict. Some of the advantages of this situation are summed up as
follows:
For uniformity and simplicity of administration it is obviously desirable for the
protected power to entrust its interests in another country to only one protecting
power, and in instances involving the protection of belligerent interests there are
advantages to all concerned ifboth belligerents entrust their interests in the other's
territory to the same protecting power.... The experience of World War II
indicates that a more uniform administration and a higher standard of treatment
of enemy interests by both belligerents result from a reciprocal protection of the
interests of those belligerents by the same protecting power throughout the
territories under the control of each belligerent?9
The limited number of states which would be available and competent to act as
Protecting Powers in any future world conflagration would, in all probability,
almost automatically bring about this result, just as it did during World War II.
The delegates at the Diplomatic Conference which drafted the 1949
Convention foresaw the ~ossibility of numerous situations in which there would
be no Protecting Power. 0 They attempted to solve this problem by providing
in Article 10 of the convention for the designation of "substitutes" for Protecting
Powers. 31 It must, however, be emphasized that the provisions of this article
should not be considered as affecting the basic method of selecting either
Protecting Power or successor Protecting Powers as long as the Power of Origin
continues to exist. A successor Protecting Power, necessitated, perhaps, because
the original Protecting Power has become a belligerent, is not a "substitute" for
a Protecting Power within the meaning of Article 10, and its designation is
governed by the same rules of international law as those which govern the
32
designation of the original Protecting Power. It must also be emphasized that
a state or organization designated under the provisions of Article 10 is not a
Protecting Power as that term is used generally in international law and as it is
used specifically elsewhere in the 1949 Convention, but is merely a state or
organization performing some or many of the functions allocated to Protecting
Powers by the convention.

B. Personnel
Article 8 of the 1949 Convention provides that
... the Protecting Powers may appoint, apart from their diplomatic and consular
staff, delegates from amongst their own nationals or the nationals of other neutral
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Powers. The said delegates shall be subject to the approval of the Power with
which they are to carry out their duties.

It is obvious that the convention has accorded to the Protecting Power two
sources ofpersonnel for the execution ofits functions: its diplomatic and consular
officers stationed within the territory of the Detaining Power;33 and others of
its nationals and other neutral nationals specifically appointed for the purpose.
We shall discuss each of these sources in turn.
The normal and natural source ofpersonnel for the execution of the functions
of the Protecting Power is, of course, the diplomatic and consular personnel
already assigned to and stationed in the territory of the Detaining Power. These
officials, working under the ambassador, are experienced, they are known to
the local officials, and, perhaps most important, they are already present within
the area of operations. It is, of course, true that they already have their usual
functions to perform; but many of these functions disappear or are seriously
curtailed upon the advent of war (commercial, immigration, tourists, etc.).
While any large-scale war of lengthy duration will undoubtedly make it
necessary for the Protecting Power to supplement its regular diplomatic and
consular staff within the territory of the Detaining Power, there will be
numerous instances in which the Protecting Power will be able to perform its
functions with only its normal complement of officials, at least for some
considerable period of time and until the number of prisoners of war held by
the Detaining Power makes a build-up of personnel essential. Of course, the
term "diplomatic and consular staff" includes not only those officials of the
Protecting Power who were already stationed within the territory of the
Detaining Power at the time of the designation of the Protecting Power, but
also any of its other diplomatic and consular personnel who may be sent to
replace or supplement them.
With the heavy commitments which Switzerland had during World War II,
it would obviously have been impossible for it to have made even a pretense of
performing its far-flung responsibilities as a Protecting Power without a
considerable increase in its staffi in the territories of the many Detaining Powers
where it had consented to function. To accomplish this purpose the Swiss
Government recruited in Switzerland and sent to its various affected embassies
and legations "camp inspectors," who had the function of periodically visiting
prisoner-of-war camps and work areas to assure that there was comRliance by
34
the Detaining Power with the provisions of the 1929 Convention. This is
typical of the second source of personnel the use of which is authorized by
Article 8 of the 1949 Convention-the non-career national who is selected by
the government of the Protecting Power solely for the purpose of assisting it in
performing its functions. He may also be the national of another neutral, but
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nonnally the Protecting Power would resort to this type of selection only when
it has exhausted its own manpower potential. Of course, a major source of
non-career personnel is to be found among the nationals of the Protecting Power
and of other neutral Powers who are residing within the territory of the
Detaining Power when the use of additional personnel becomes necessary. The
Protecting Power may sometimes find it more convenient, when it has exhausted
the list of its own nationals residing in the territory of the Detaining Power, to
use neutral nationals falling within this category before resorting to the policy
of recruiting its own nationals in its own territory and sending them to the
territory of the Detaining Power.
It will have been noted that these non-career, or auxiliary, personnel are
subject to the approval of the Detaining Power. This has occasioned considerable
discussion, both at and since the Diplomatic Conference. No objection can be
perceived to this procedure. The diplomatic and consular personnel of the
Protecting Power stationed within the territory of the Detaining Power must
have the nonnal approval of the state to which they are accredited (agrement,
exequatur), required for all such personnel, and anyone of them may, at any
time, be declared persona non grata by that state, the Detaining Power. The writer
finds himself in complete accord with the statement that
... it appeared to be incompatible with international usage that the occasional,
auxiliary and temporary staff recruited by the Protecting Power should enjoy a
35
more favorable status than the usual diplomatic or consular staff.

The fear has been expressed that a Detaining Power might arbitrarily refuse
to approve any of the auxiliary personnel nominated by the Protecting Power
and thereby make it impossible for the latter properly to perfonn its functions.
But a Detaining Power so minded could also, and with equal ease, arbitrarily
decline to grant the necessary agrement or exequatur to replacement or
supplementary diplomatic or consular personnel of the Protecting Power. Either
of these acts would constitute a violation of the spirit, if not the letter, of the
convention. Until the contrary is affirmatively established, it must be assumed
that states parties to the convention will carry out their obligations in good faith.
The restriction which we have just been discussing is logical from another
standpoint. The individuals concerned will, in the perfonnance of their
functions, be required to do considerable traveling within a country at war. Any
country at war must institute controls on the right to enter into and to travel
within its territory. To tell it that it must accept anyone selected by the Protecting
Power, even though it has good reason not to trust the particular individual, is
to close one's eyes to the facts of life. And for this same reason, the Detaining
Power must retain the right to declare members of the staff of the Protecting
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Power persona non grata, whether the individual concerned has diplomatic,
con~ular, or auxiliary status.
It has been stated that the representatives of the Protecting Power engaged
in perfonning its functions in the territory of the Detaining Power have a triple
responsibility: to their own government; to the government of the Power of
36
Origin; and to the government of the Detaining Power. If this is another way
of saying that these individuals must be completely neutral and unbiased, it is
correct. It would, however, be less controversial to state, as did William Jennings
Bryan, that they are "representatives of a neutral power whose attitude toward
the parties to the conflict is one of impartial amity...37

C. Functions
Unfortunately, with only a very few exceptions, the drafters of the 1949
Convention apparently found it necessary to avoid any attempt to specify in
detail the functions of the Protecting Power. Most frequently these functions
are expressed either in the form of duties of the Detaining Power or rights of
the prisoners of war. Where a precedent had previously been established, it is
set forth in appropriate detail. Where no precedent had previously been
established, the problem is normally left to ad hoc decision. It was probably
anticipated that such problems would be solved by the Protecting Power through
the exercise by it of the basic power guaranteed to it, that of surveillance to
insure that there is, at all times, full compliance with the provisions of the
convention. Should the Protecting Power ascertain that there is a default in the
performance of some particular provision, it is apparently assumed that it will
find a means of procuring a correction of the situation, even though such means
.
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IS not spec e .
Nevertheless, the convention does contain repeated references to the
Protecting Power and a function may usually be implied in a particular instance
merely from such a reference. It is difficult, indeed, to categorize these varied
references to the Protecting Power. Extremely broad categories are required,
and even then not every function will fall within them. Several not wholl~
successful efforts have been made to list these references on a functional basis?
For the purposes of this discussion they will be considered under three general
categories: powers and duties; liaison functions; and miscellaneous functions (the
functions listed in each category do not purport to be all-inclusive).

(1) Powers and Duties:
The basic and overriding power granted to the Protecting Power by the 1949
Convention is, of course, that contained in Article 8, the very first sentence of
which states that the convention
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... shall be applied with the cooperation and under the scrutiny of the Protecting
Powers whose duty it is to safeguard the interests of the Parties to the conflict.
This provision has been tenned, and rightly so, "the keystone of the
.
,,40
conventlOns.
Strangely enough, the only extended debate on this extremely crucial article
which took place at the Diplomatic Conference concerned the selection of the
proper word to characterize the activities of the Protecting Power, and that
debate occurred primarily as a result of difficulties of translation. The delegates
at the Diplomatic Conference were agreed that the Protecting Power could not
give orders or directives to the Detaining Power. The idea which it was desired
to convey was that the authority of the Protecting Power would entitle it to
verify whether the convention was being properly applied and, if necessary, to
4
suggest measures on behalf of prisoners of war. In the draft text the words
"under the supervision of the Protecting Power" were used in the English
version and the words "sous Ie controle des Puissances protectrices" in the French.
This was acceptable to the French-speaking delegates but was opposed by those
who were English-speaking. It eventually became apparent that the two groups
were actually in agreement and that the seeming dispute had arisen because the
word "controle" in French is much weaker than either" control" or "supervision"
in English. The English-speaking delegations were given a choice of a number
of words to be used as a counterpart for the French word "controle" and
.
.
1y reached on the word " scrutIny.
. ,,42
unarumous
agreement was ultImate
The importance of Article 8 may, perhaps, be found to lie in the very
generality of its phrasing. The fact that the entire convention is to be "applied
with the cooperation" of the Protecting Power undoubtedly empowers the latter
to make suggestions to the Detaining Power with a view to the improvement
of the lot of the prisoner of war even with respect to areas in which no specific
reference is made to the Protecting Power. Thus, a Protecting Power might
suggest to, and seek to obtain the agreement of, the Detaining Power that certain
specified types of offenses committed by prisoners of war be punished by
disciplinary rather than judicial measures, even though Article 83 contains no
reference to the Protecting Power. Similarly, the fact that the convention is to
be applied "under the scrutiny" of the Protecting Power undoubtedly empowers
it to investigate and to request reports from the Detaining Power in unspecified
areas. Thus, a Protecting Power might seek from the Detaining Power a
complete report as to the reasons for delays in the delivery or dispatching of mail
or for the prohibition of correspondence, even though Article 76, dealing with
these subjects, contains no mention of the Protecting Power; again, it might
seek a report from the Detaining Power as to the action taken with respect to
a complaint made by a prisoner of war, through the Protecting Power, regarding
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the conditions ofhis captivity, even though Article 78, which authorizes such
complaints, does not specifically provide for such a report.
Perhaps on only a slighdy lower level of importance than Article 8 is Article
126 which empowers the representatives of the Protecting Power to visit all
places where prisoners of war may be, themselves selecting the places they will
visit and determining the frequency of the visits; to have access to all premises
where prisoners are confined; to go to the place of departure, passage, and arrival
of prisoners who are being transferred; and to interview prisoners and prisoners'
43
representatives without witnesses. The significant nature of these provisions
is so patent as to make any discussion superfluous.
Other powers and duties of the Protecting Power are, indeed, varied. For
example, it is directed to lend its good offices to assist in settling disputes with
respect to the application and interpretation of the convention (Article 11); it is
authorized to inspect the financial records of individual prisoners of war (Article
65); it may, in the interests of the prisoners, permit the Detaining Power to
reduce below the specified minimum the number of communications which
may be sent out each month by each prisoner (Article 71); it may, in the interests
of the prisoners, propose a limit on the number of packages which a prisoner
may receive (Article 72); it may itself take over the transport of capture cards,
mail, packages, and legal documents, should military operations prevent the
Detaining Power from ful:fi.lling its obligations in this respect (Article 75); it has
an unrestricted right to receive complaints from individual prisoners and from
prisoners' representatives (Article 78); it has the right to inspect the record of
disciplinary punishments (Article 96); and it has the duty to find counsel for a
prisoner against whom judicial proceedings have been instituted, and the right
to attend the trial (Article 105).

(2) Liaison Fundions:
In its liaison capacity the Protecting Power is actually litde more than a
conduit. It serves merely as the means of relaying necessary communications
between the Detaining Power and the Power of Origin. Protecting Powers are,
not infrequendy, the sole means readily available for the transmittal of messages
between the two belligerents. And, of course, while a great many liaison
functions are specifically set forth in the 1949 Convention, this is one area in
which the Protecting Power may safely operate, even where the particular liaison
mission which it undertakes is not among those enumerated in the convention.
The Detaining Power is required to give to the Protecting Power for relay
to the Power of Origin the geographical location of all prisoner-of-war camps
so that the prisoners will not, as has happened, accidentally become the target
of their own compatriots (Article 23). The reasons for any limitations placed by
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the Detaining Power on the amount of funds made available to a prisoner of
war from advances of pay must be conveyed to the Protecting Power,
presumably for transmittal to the Power of Origin (Article 60). The Detaining
Power must advise the Protecting Power, for relay to the Power of Origin, of
the rate of daily working pay which it has fixed (Article 62). Transmittals of
payments by prisoners of war to their own country are made by notification
from the Detaining Power to the Power of Origin through the medium of the
Protecting Power (Article 63). Notifications with respect to the status of the
accounts of prisoners of war (Article 65) and of prisoners whose captivity has,
for some reason, such as escape, death, or other means, terminated (Article 66),
are also sent by the Detaining Power to the Power ofOrigin through the medium
of the Protecting Power. Claims of prisoners for injury or disease arising out of
assigned work are similarly transmitted (Article 68). Information with respect to
the measures taken by the Detaining Power to enable prisoners to communicate
with the exterior must be transmitted to the Power of Origin through the
Protecting Power (Article 69). And the Protecting Power must be informed,
presumably for the information of the Power of Origin, as well as for its own,
ofall offenses punishable by death under the laws ofthe Detaining Power (Article
100).
In several instances the convention provides for the exchange ofinformation
between the belligerents without specifying how this is to be accomplished.
Unquestionably, these are areas in which, as noted above, the Protecting Power
would feel qualified to intervene, even though it has no specific mandate. For
example, Article 21 provides for an exchange of information between
belligerents as to their respective laws and regulations on the subject of parole,
and Article 43 provides for an exchange of information with respect to military
titles and ranks, but neither of these articles states how the exchange is to be
made. The Protecting Powers are available and competent to perform this liaison
function; and it may be assumed that either the Detaining Powers would request
their services for this purpose or the Protecting Powers would, themselves, offer
their services for the transmittal of the required information.

(3) Miscellaneous Functions:
There are a number of references to the Protecting Power in the 1949
Convention which cannot rightly be designated as powers or duties but which
are likewise not precisely liaison functions. For lack of a more descriptive term,
and because, for the most part, they bear little or no relationship to each other,
they are here considered as miscellaneous functions.
Thus, Article 12 provides that if a Detaining Power, to whom prisoners of
war have been transferred by the original Detaining Power, fails to carry out the
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provisions of the convention, the original Detaining Power will, upon being
notified to that effect by the Protecting Power, either take measures to correct
the situation or request the return of the prisoners concerned. And Article 58
indicates, without specifically so providing, that some time after the outbreak
of hostilities the Detaining Power and the Protecting Power will enter into an
arrangement relating to the possession of money by prisoners of war.
Again, Article 79 requires the Detaining Power to infonn the Protecting
Power of its reasons therefor whenever it refuses to approve a duly elected
prisoners' representative; and Article 81 requires the Detaining Power to infonn
the Protecting Power of its reasons for dismissing a prisoners' representative. In
neither of these articles is there any indication of the action it is contemplated
that the Protecting Power will take when the required infonnation is given to
it. While the infonnation might, in the exercise of the Protecting Power's liaison
function and as a matter of routine, be passed to the Power of Origin, this action
alone would have little significance. Under its right to scrutinize the application
of the convention, the Protecting Power would probably, in an appropriate case,
take issue with the Detaining Power's action with respect to the non-approval
or the dismissal of a prisoners' representative.
Further, Article 121 provides that the Detaining Power shall investigate and
make a full report to the Protecting Power of every death or serious injury of a
prisoner of war caused or suspected to have been caused by a sentry, another
prisoner of war, or any other person, or where the cause of death is unknown;
and that if guilt is indicated, the Detaining Power will prosecute the responsible
persons. Certainly it is to be expected that the Protecting Power will forward
the report of the incident to the Power of Origin; but it is equally certain that
the Protecting Power would, on its own initiative, make demarches to the
Detaining Power, if it felt that the investigation had been inade2uate or that a
4
prosecution indicated by the investigation had not taken place.
It is believed that the foregoing short presentation of only a few types of
provisions adequately establishes that the Protecting Power has certain functions
which cannot exactly be fitted into either the category of powers or duties or
the category of liaison functions, and that these miscellaneous functions can
probably become whatever the particular Protecting Power desires them to be.

(4) Limitations:
Each of the four conventions drafted at the 1949 Diplomatic Conference
45
contains an article similar to Article 8 of the Prisoner of War Convention.
However, in the Third and Fourth Conventions (prisoner of War and Civilian
Conventions, respectively) the Protecting Powers are merely admonished to
"take account of the imperative necessities of security of the State wherein they
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carry out their duties," while in the First and Second (Wounded and Sick of
Anned Forces in the Field-the "Red Cross Convention"-and Wounded,
Sick and Shipwrecked at Sea, respectively), not only are they so admonished,
but they are told in an oblique fashion that their activities may be restricted "as
an exceptional and temporary measure when this is rendered necessary by
imperative military necessities. ,,46 The importance of the distinction drawn
between the two pairs of conventions was fully appreciated at the time of the
drafting of the conventions and was the occasion for some spirited debate. While
on its face the solution reached by the convention is plainly a victory for those
who sought to exclude the possibility of any shackles being placed on the
Protecting Power in the perfonnance of its functions with respect to frisoners
of war, it remains to be seen whether this result was actually attained. 7
Assuming that the Detaining Power desires to impose the "exceptional and
temporary" restrictions on visits of the Protecting Power which are authorized
in Article 126 of the 1949 Convention, or the right to the even more extensive
restrictions on the activities of the Protecting Power which is asserted by some
states to exist, whether or not specified in the convention, how and by whom
is the decision to be made as to whether "imperative military necessities" do, in
fact, exist? There is one school of thought which takes the position that it would
be illogical to permit the determination to be made by the Detaining Power
itself, as it would be judging its own case, and which insists that only the
Protecting Power can validly make such a determination. 48 While, from a strictly
humanitarian point of view, there is much to be said in favor of this position, it
cannot, as a practical matter, be justified. If, for example, the Detaining Power
deems it essential to keep representatives of the Protecting Power temporarily
out of an area, lest military movements noted therein inadvertently lead to the
disclosure of important impending military actions, there would be little logic
in compelling it to advise the Protecting Power what and why it was so doing
in order to permit the latter to determine whether imperative military necessities
actually existed and whether the restriction was really justified. This is
unquestionably a matter which will, in the course of events and through
reciprocal actions of the belligerents, adjust itself inasmuch as time and
experience will very quickly result in an infonnal mutual appreciation as to
where the line is to be drawn. 49
D. Relationship to the ICRC

The multifold operations of the ICRC are obviously not within the scope of
this article. However, inasmuch as the functions of the Protecting Power and
those of the ICRC often overlap insofar as prisoners of war are concerned, it
appears appropriate to mention, at least briefly, some of the overlapping areas. 50
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The basic safeguard to the activities of the I CRC is contained in Article 9 of
the 1949 Convention, which specifies:
The provisions of the present Convention constitute no obstacle to the
humanitarian activities which the International Committee of the Red Cross or
any other impartial humanitarian organization may, subject to the consent of the
Parties to the conflict concerned, undertake for the protection of prisoners of war
and for their relie£
Despite a substantially similar provision in Article 88 of the 1929 Convention,
the ICRC found, during World War II, that it was, at times, necessary to
overcome the feeling of some belligerents that it was attempting to duplicate
the functions of the Protecting Powers. Apparendy it succeeded in convincing
51
them that such was not the case.
It has already been pointed out that Article 10 of the 1949 Convention
contains provisions for the designation of "substitutes" for Protecting Powers
under certain circumstances. The third paragraph of Article 10 provides that,
failing such a "substitute," the Detaining Power shall request or accept
... the offer ofthe services ofa humanitarian organization, such as the International
Committee of the Red Cross, to assume the humanitarian functions performed
by Protecting Powers under the present Convention.
It must be emphasized that when the ICRC is thus called upon to serve, it does
so as a humanitarian organization and not as a Protecting Power which, by
52
definition, it cannot be, inasmuch as it is not a state.
In a number of areas the convention places the ICRC on the same plane as
the Protecting Power. As we have seen, Article 126 is of major importance in
its grant of authority to the Protecting Power to go wherever prisoners of war
are located. 53 That article also specifies that "The delegates of the International
Committee of the Red Cross shall enjoy the same prerogatives." A similar
parallel is to be found in Article 56 dealing with the locations of, and visits to,
labor detachments. And it is not surprising that we find the ICRC referred to
along with the Protecting Power in Articles 72 and 75, for these two articles are
among those relating to individual and collective relief shipments, a subject of
particular interest to the ICRC and one with respect to which it has developed
an unchallengeable expertise as a result of experience gained in innumerable
conflicts. Most Protecting Powers would probably be more than \villing to
permit the ICRC to pre-empt the handling of this difficult and complicated
function.
Articles 79 and 81 authorize the prisoners' representatives to communicate
with the ICRC as well as the Protecting Power. Here, however, it is believed
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that the purpose of each such authorization to communicate is fundamentally
different. The creation of the position of prisoners' representative was first
suggested during the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871) and became a reality
54
during World War 1. The function for which it was originally created was to
receive and distribute relief packages. However, over the course of time, the
functions of the prisoners' representatives have been gready expanded, and
during World War II it was not unusual to find them involved in practically all
of the problems of a prisoner-of-war camp. Thus, they were frequendy used by
the prisoners as the channel for the transmittal of complaints both to the
Detaining Power and to the Protecting Power. The drafters of the 1949
Convention were fully aware of this development,55 and it appears that the steps
which they took were intended to insure that the privileges accorded to the
prisoners' representative would permit him to communicate with the delegates
of the ICRC on problems relating to relief shipments and with the Protecting
Power on this subject as well as on the myriad of other problems into which
the prisoners' representative is now projected.
It is probably safe to state that, while the allocation offunctions by the 1949
Convention between the Protecting Power and the ICRC is not always as clearly
stated as it might have been, the fundamental differences between the two and
between their methods of operation are such that conflicts between them would
be extremely rare. 56

III. Conclusion
The past century has seen tremendous advances made in the concept of the
Protecting Power as an instrument ofintemationallaw, both in the role which
it is called upon to play and in the prestige which it enjoys and which goes far
in assisting it to perform the numerous functions which have now been assigned
to it. It appears unquestionable that:
The presence of the Protecting Powers today remains the sole means ofputting
a brake on the excesses of Detaining Powers, the sole element of moderation and
ofmorality in the treatment ofenemy persons, their belongings, and their interests:
this was noted and affirmed many times at Geneva.S7
The results of the 1949 Diplomatic Conference reveal clearly that the nations
of the world were generally prepar<:d to accept a solid basis for the activities of
the Protecting Power. It was conceded a mission of close observation of the
application of the provisions of the Prisoner of War Convention drafted at that
Conference, a mission which necessarily incorporates within it a right to call to
the attention of the Detaining Power any failure of performance which it finds
and to report any such failure of performance to the Power of Origin; a sizeable
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expansion was made in its functions and, correlatively, in its power and authority;
provision was made for substitutes for Protecting Powers in order to insure that
prisoners of war would at all times benefit from the exercise of the functions of
the Protecting Power, thus correcting the situation which had arisen all too
frequendy during World War II; and the use of the institution of the Protecting
Power was extended not only to the Red Cross Convention (Wounded and
Sick of Armed Forces in the Field), but also to the convention which adapts the
Red Cross Convention to maritime warfare (Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked
at Sea), and to the completely new Civilian Convention. 58 These few examples
alone demonstrate the great distance which has been traversed since 1907, when
the prisoner-of-war provisions of the Regulations Respecting the Laws and
Customs ofWar on Land were drafted at The Hague and contained no reference
whatsoever to the Protecting Power.
In many respects the provisions of the 1949 Geneva Conventions relating to
the Protecting Power represent compromises. Positions reached solely in order
to bring about agreement between opposing viewpoints can rarely be considered
perfect and the present case is no exception. However, these provisions
unquestionably represent a great step forward in the evolution of international
law and would undoubtedly be viewed with amazement by those who drafted
the first Red Cross Convention in 1864 or even by those who acted on behalf
of the Protecting Powers as recendy as in 1914, at the beginning of World War
1.
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The Protecting Power is now a generally accepted institution ofinternational
law. It is the subject of international agreements to which most of the states of
the world are parties. There are clear indications that it has been weighed in the
balance and not been found wanting, with the result that it has been, and in the
future will continue to be, requested to assume numerous new functions on
behalf of states at war.
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Humanitaires en cas de Conflit arme," in 2 Annuaire Fran~ais de Droit International 343 (1956). The subject
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Treatment of Prisoners of War (hereinafter referred to as Commentary) (1960). Modern texts on international
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the Protecting Power. The Protecting Power, which is the subject of this article, must not be confused with
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Service were permitted to make such inspections. Flory, op at. 108-109.
11. Eroglu, op. at. 27-28.
12. For example, Art. VIII ofthe Final Act ofthe Conference ofCopenhagen ofNov. 2, 1917 (photostatic
copy on file in The Army Library, Washington, D.C.), to which Austria-Hungary, Germany, Rumania, and
Russia were the belligerent parties, dealt with "Arrangements concerning the Admission of the Delegates of
the Protecting Power ••• on the Basis of Reciprocity"; Art. XI of the Agreement between the British and
Turkish Governments respecting Prisoners of War and Civilians, executed at Bern on Dec. 28, 1917 (111
Brit. and For. State Papers 557-568), dealt with thesubject ofvisits to prisoner-of-war camps by "representatives
of the Protecting Powers"; and the Agreement between the United States of America and Germany
Concerning Prisoners of War, Sanitary Personnel, and Civilians, executed at Bern on Nov. 11, 1918 (13
AJ.I.L. Supp. 1 (1919); Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918, Supp. 2, p. 103), contains references
to the Protecting Power in no less than 25 separate paragraphs.
13. Rasmussen, Code des Prisonniers de Guerre 56 (1931).
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Protecting Power be given the benefit of"well-defined and precise provisions." Final Record ofthe Diplomatic
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15. The 1929 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment ofPrisonetS of War (hereinafter referred
to as the 1929 Convention), 47 Stat. 2021; Treaty Series, No. 846: 27 AJ.I.L. Supp. 59 (1933). It is interesting
to note that the companion convention drafted at the same Diplomatic Conference, The Geneva Convention
for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick of Armies in the Field (better known as the
1929 Geneva Red Cross Convention), 47 Stat. 2074; Treaty Series, No. 847; 27 AJ.I.L. Supp. 43 (1933), a
direct descendant of the 1864 and 1906 Geneva Red Cross Conventions, continued to contain no reference
to Protecting PowetS, a situation which was only remedied 20 yeatS later, after World War II.
16. Art. 86 of the 1929 Convention reads as follows:
"The High Contracting Parties recognize that the regular application of the present Convention will find
a guaranty in the possibility of collaboration of the protecting PowetS charged with safeguarding the interests
ofbelligerents; in this respect, the protecting PowetS may, besides their diplomatic petSonnel, appoint delegates
from among their own nationals or from among the nationals of other neutral PowetS. These delegates must
be subject to the approval of the belligerent near which they exercise their mission.
"Representatives of the protecting Power or its accepted delegates shall be permitted to go any place,
without exception, where prisonetS of war are interned. They shall have access to all places occupied by
prisonetS and may interview them, as a general rule without witnesses, petSonally or through interpretetS.
"Belligerents shall so far as possible facilitate the task of representatives or accepted delegates of the
protecting Power. The militaty authorities shall be informed of their visit.
"Belligerents may come to an agreement to allow petSons of the same nationality as the prisonetS to be
permitted to take part in inspection trips."
In addition, the Protecting PowetS were specifically given such functions as: receiving complaints from
prisonetS of war (Art. 42); conferring with the representatives ("agents") of prisonetS of war (Arts. 43 and 44);
and assuring that prisonetS ofwar who were subjected to judicial prosecutions were adequately protected (Arts.
60, 62, 65, and 66). Evidence that the draftetS of the convention were attempting merely to formalize and
perpetuate an existing status, and not to create a new one, is found in the use in relation to the exercise of its
functions by the Protecting Power of such terms as "mediation" (Art. 31) and "good offices" (Art.87).
17. Ch. 2 of the Annex to the 1907 Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War
on Land, 36 Stat. 2277; Treaty Series, No. 539; 2 A.J.I.L. Supp. 90 (1909).
18. The U.S.S.R. took the position that, as it was a party to the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907, the
Annex to which, it asserted, covered "all the main questions of the regime of captivity" (but not, as has
previously been pointed out in note 8 above, the question of the designation or functions of the Protecting
PowetS), there was no need for it to consider an Italian proposal to apply reciprocally the provisions of the
1929 Convention (Report ofthe International Committee ofthe Red Cross on its Activities during the Second
World War (hereinafter referred to as ICRC Report), Vol. I, p. 412). WhileJapan stated its intention to "apply
this Convention mutatis mutandis, to all prisonetS of war" (ibid. 443), the Protecting PowetS were never
permitted to function in a manner even remotely resembling their manner of functioning in the territories"
of most of the other belligerents. As a result of the foregoing, and of the disappearance of many PowetS of
Origin during the coutSe of hostilities, the ICRC estimates that during World War II approximately 70% of
all prisonetS of war were deprived of the services of a Protecting Power. De la Pradelle, op. at. 226. Thus,
Germany denied the status of states to Poland, Yugoslavia, France and Belgium (after the 1940 armistices),
Free France, and Italy (after Mussolini's overthrow in 1943), and refused to permit the intervention of
Protecting PowetS on behalf of their captured petSonnel. Pictet, "La Croix-Rouge et les Conventions de
Geneve," in 76 Hague Academy Recueil des COUtS 5, 87 (1950, I).
19. The 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment ofPrisonetS of War (hereinafter referred
to as the 1949 Convention), 6 U.S. Treaties 3316; 75 U.N. Treaty Series 135 (I: 972); 47 AJ.I.L. Supp. 119
(1953). There were signed, on the same day, three other conventions in which, for the fitSt time in other than
a prisoner-of-war convention, references were made to Protecting PowetS: Art. 8 and othetS of the 1949
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the
Field (the successor to the 1929 Red Cross Convention mentioned in note 15 above), 6 U.S. Treaties 3114;
75 U.N. Treaty Series 31 (I: 970); Art. 8 and othetS of the 1949 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of
the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked MembetS of Armed Forces at Sea, 6 U.S. Treaties
3217; 75 U.N. Treaty Series 85 (I: 971); and Art. 9 and othetS of the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to
the Protection of Civilian PetSons in Time of War, 6 U. S. Treaties 3516; 75 U.N. Treaty Series 287 (I: 973);
50 AJ.I.L Supp. 724 (1956). This latter convention will undoubtedly prove ofmajor importance in extending
the functions of the Protecting Power in any future international conflict.
20. References to the Protecting Power are contained in 36 of its 132 substantive articles (4, 8, 10, II,
12,23,56,58,60,62,63,65,66,68,69,71, 72,73,75,77,78,79,81,96,98,100,101,104,105,107,108,
120, 121, 122, 126, and 128) as well as in two ofits Annexes The basic charter for the Protecting Power is
contained in Art. 8, which reads:
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"The present Convention shall be applied with the cooperation and under the scrutiny of the Protecting
Powers whose duty it is to safeguard the interests of the Parties to the conflict. For this purpose, the Protecting
Powers may appoint, apart from their diplomatic or consular staff, delegates from amongst their own nationals
or the nationals of other neutral Powers. The said delegates shall be subject to the approval of the Power with
which they are to carry out their duties.
"The Parties to the conflict shall facilitate to the greatest extent possible the task of the representatives or
delegates of the Protecting Powers.
"The representatives or delegates of the Protecting Powers shall not in any case exceed their mission under
the present Convention. They shall, in particular, take account of the imperative necessities of security of the
State wherein they carry out their duties."
21. Le Comite International de la Croix-Rouge et Ie Conflit de Coree: Recueil de Documents, Vol. I,
p. 16 (1952).
22. The U.N. Command permitted the ICRC to perform its usual functions with respect to the
Communist prisoners of war held by the UNC. Pictet, Commentary 546. As we shall see many of these
functions parallel, or may be substituted for, those of a Protecting Power. Unfortunately, all efforts of the
ICRC to act north of the battle line were repulsed by the Communists. Treatment ofBritish Prisoners of War
in Korea 33-34 (British Ministry of Defence, 1955).
23. Up to the end of 1959 there had been 77 ratifications of, and accessions to, these conventions.
International Committee of the Red Cross, Annual Report, 1959, at p. 45 (1959). These include all of the
more important Powers except Canada and the Republic of China. The use of the institution ofthe Protecting
Power has since been resorted to in the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of
Armed Conflict, signed at The Hague on May 14, 1954 (249 U.N. Treaty Series 215 (I: 3511»,. where it is
adopted as a means of overseeing the protection ofinanimate objects-which is, actually, merely a variation
of the protection furnished historically by the Protecting Power, a very large part of its energies having once
been directed towards the protection of the embassy buildings and diplomatic archives of the Protected Power.
24. As was aptly stated by one author: "What happened was that an existing usage was taken, and
transformed into a regulation. It was the organ which created the function." Siordet, op. cit. 3.
25. It must at all times be borne in mind that the Protecting Power is not a general agent of the Power of
Origin. In his book, The Present Law of War and Neutrality (1954), Castren defines the over-all relationship
between these two Powers as follows (at p. 92):
"The protecting Power does not act in its own name but rather as a kind of caretaker or intennediary.
Nevertheless, it acts i"depetldetJlly in so far as the State whose interests it protects cannot demand, but only
request, it to perform certain services, and the protecting Power itself decides the way in which it discharges
its mission. Nor maya belligerent give instructions to those organs of the protecting Power which carry out
this mission. Instead, requests to the protecting Power have to be made through diplomatic channels. The
protecting Power may refuse to act when compliance with a request would be contrary to its own interests
or infringe the lawful right of the enemy State."
26. Siordet states that the designation of a Protecting Power is no longer optional but is now "quasi
obligatoire" ("De l'Application et du Contrale des Conventions de Geneve de 1949," in 1956 Revue
Internationale de la Croix-Rouge 464, 468); that it is now put in the "imperative form" (The Geneva
Conventions of1949: The Question of Scrutiny 36); and that in performing its mission the Protecting Power
is no longer the special representative of one of the parties, but is "the representative of all the Contracting
Parties to the Convention" (ibid.).
27. This is the step which the United States apparently failed to take when it was requested to perform
the functions of the Protecting Power for Great Britain during the Boer War. See discussion above.
28. The 1949 Convention contains no provisions with respect to the qualifications ofa Protecting Power,
the method of designation, etc., leaving these problems for settlement under general international law.
Heckenroth, Les Puissances Protectrices et les Conventions de Geneve 62 and 224 (unpublished thesis,
Universite d'Aix-Marseille, 1951). This solution will work until one belligerent arbitrarily elects to deny its
consent to every neutral nominated by its enemy. In the light of the adamant refusal of the U.S.S.R. to permit
any type ofinspection to take place on its terti tory during peacetime, it seems unlikely that such activity would
be permitted in time ofwar, even though the U.S.S.R. participated actively in the drafting of the 1949 Geneva
Conventions and has ratified them, as have all of its satellites, \vithout any reservations as to Art. 8.
29. Franklin, op. cit. 164-165. A similar conclusion is reached in Pictet, Commentary 95-96, wherein this
statement appears:
"It became more and more common for these neutral Powers to find themselves responsible for
representing the respective interests oftwo opposing Parties at one and the same time. This gave them additional
authority, and incidentally altered their role; for once a Power represented the interests of two opposing
belligerents, it became not so much the special representative of each of them, as the common agent of both,
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or a kind of umpire. This enabled it to bring directly into play that powerful instrument, the argument of
reciprocity, to obtain the improvements desired."
In 1945 Switzerland alone represented 34 belligerents, and in many cases it represented opposing
belligerents in the territory of each other. Eroglu, op. at. 144-148.
30. For some of these possible situations see Siordet, op. at. 49-53; and Heckenroth, op. at. 229-236.
31. The French Delegation strongly urged that a provision be included in the 1949 Convention setting
up an international body to perform the functions of Protecting Powers in the absence of the latter (Final
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